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I. INTRODUCTION
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) is one of the
most devastating health problems the world has ever faced. Ap-
proximately 10 million people worldwide carry the AIDS vi-
rus-the Human Immuno-deficiency Virus (HIV)-and an esti-
mated 2 million more have full-blown cases of AIDS.1 In the
United States, local and state health centers had reported 230,181
cases of AIDS as of August 1992.2 In 1991 alone, the National Cen-
ters for Infectious Diseases reported 45,506 new cases of AIDS.'
Given the prevalence of the disease and the costs associated
with treatment," the issue of AIDS in the workplace is a growing
concern. In the private U.S. maritime industry, AIDS is of special
concern." First, the industry is in troubled economic times.' The
1. Marsha F. Goldsmith, Physicians at AMA Amsterdam News Seminar Offer Pano-
ramic View of Their Varied Roles in Pandemic, 268 J. AM. MED. Ass'N 1237, 1237 (1992)
[hereinafter Goldsmith, Amsterdam News Seminar]. One medical study predicts that in the
next three years, 3.8 million people will develop AIDS, and an additional 6.9 million persons
will be infected. Marsha F. Goldsmith, Critical Moment at Hand in HIV/AIDS Pandemic:
New Global Strategy to Arrest Its Spread Proposed, 268 J. Am. MED. Ass'N 445, 445 (1992)
[hereinafter Goldsmith, Critical Moment].
2. Marsha F. Goldsmith, Specific HIV-Related Problems of Women Gain More Atten-
tion at a Price-Affecting More Women, 268 J. Am. MED. Ass'N 1814, 1816 (1992) [hereinaf-
ter Goldsmith, Affecting More Women].
3. National Center for Infectious Diseases, Acquired Immunodeficiency Syn-
drome-1991, 268 J. Am. MED. Ass'N 713, 713 (1992). This figure is up 5% from 1990 when
local, state, and territorial health departments reported 43,352 new cases. Id.
4. Cornelis A. Rietneijer et al., Cost of Care for Patients with Human Immu-
nodeficiency Virus Infection: Patterns of Utilization and Charges in a Public Health Care
System, 153 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 219, available in LEXIS, Genmed Library, JNLS File
(estimating lifetime costs for AIDS treatments as ranging from $35,000 to $90,000; annual
costs for patients with AIDS-related complex as $4913 per year).
The cost for one year's treatment of azidothynidine (AZT) is about $2500. Goldsmith,
Critical Moment, supra note 1, at 446.
5. In fact, a sailor was the first reported victim of AIDS. Mike Woods, Kinky Sex?
Nuclear Fallout? How Did AIDS Really Begin?, OTrAWA CITIZEN, July 19, 1992, at B5;
Study Traces AIDS Death Back to '59, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, July 6, 1990, at 3.
Three publications have previously dealt with the AIDS crisis as it affects the maritime
industry: Judith A. Mellman, AIDS, the American Seaman and the Law of Personal In-
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additional burdens of treating seamen with AIDS may only serve
to batter an industry that is already foundering under the United
States's strict laws regarding labor relations and benefits for
seamen.' Forcing shipowners to absorb these increased costs of
medical benefits may worsen the situation.8 Second, while the
AIDS epidemic threatens to strike all segments of society, seamen,
as a group, may suffer from AIDS at a rate that far exceeds the
national average.'
The uncertainty surrounding a shipowner's liability for a sea-
jury, 13 TUL. MAR. L.J. 101 (1988); THE FLORIDA BAR, AIDS, PUBLIC HEALTH AND MARITIME
LAW SEMINAR (Feb. 27, 1989) (Collection of the seminar's lecture outlines and program);
Paul A. Londynsky, Maritime Law and the AIDS Crisis: Storm Clouds on the Horizon, 1
U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 173 (1989).
6. CLINTON H. WHITEHUST, THE U.S. SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY 192-93 (1986) (commenting
that "'the United States is moving inexorably toward a nationalized maritime industry.").
Statistics indicate that the U.S. maritime industry has declined since 1960. U.S. BUREAU
OF CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1991, at 1094-1104 (111th ed.
1991). Since 1960, the percentage of U.S. registered vessels with a capacity of 100 tons or
more has decreased, while the gross tonnage shipped by U.S. vessels has also decreased. Id.
at 1102. Despite this decrease in the U.S. shipping industry's capacity, the tonnage of cargo
imported into and exported from the United States has increased. Id. at 1094. These statis-
tics show the growing reliance of the United States on foreign flagged vessels.
In the cruise industry, foreign dependence is even greater. For instance, 98% of the
cruise ships visiting or operating out of U.S. ports are foreign registered. Michael M. Phil-
lips, Coast Guard Defends Cruise Ship Safety, States News Serv., May 29, 1991, available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File. Because cruise ships require far larger crews than
cargo vessels and because U.S. laws and regulations make wages and benefits for crew mem-
bers more expensive, the number of American-flagged cruise ships has dropped to two. See
Michael Doan, Raising the "Scuttled" U.S. Merchant Fleet, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., July
19, 1982, at 43 ("A prime reason [for the U.S. fleet's inability to compete with foreign fleets]
is wages."); Shirley Slater & Harry Basch, Cruise Views: Convenience Is Sometimes Foreign
on Vessels, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1990, at L12 (noting that American Hawaii Cruises owns
the only two large, ocean-going U.S.-flagged cruise ships).
Indeed, the world shipping industry has a less than optimistic prognosis. DANIEL TODD,
THE WORLD SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY 356 (1985).
7. See Slater & Basch, supra note 6, at L12.
8. Cf. Doan, supra note 6, at 43.
9. Mellman, supra note 5, at 107 ("Seamen tend to be uneducated, are less likely to be
concerned with their health, and seldom form stable marital unions.")(citing M. SHERAR,
SHIPPING OUT: A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF THE AMERICAN MERCHANT SEAMAN 19-57 (1973)); see
also John Otis, Honduras-AIDS, UPI, Mar. 27, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
UPI File (reporting that AIDS has spread especially quickly in Honduran port towns);
Nikola Antonov, Anti-AIDS Drive Slows Spread of Disease in Bulgaria, RUETER LIBR. REP.,
Dec. 1, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File (reporting that sailors con-
tracted AIDS before other groups in Bulgaria); Richard Woodman, Early Treatment Slows
AIDS Growth, Press Association Newsfile, Nov. 10, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Li-
brary, Omni File (noting that "sailors are particularly at risk from AIDS"); Kenya Bans
American Blood, Xinhua General Overseas News Service, June 17, 1989, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File (reporting that Kenya banned American sailors from do-
nating blood, fearing AIDS contamination).
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man with AIDS under the doctrine of maintenance and cure'0 may
lead to two practices in marine employment. First, employers may
attempt to inquire into the HIV status of applicants before hiring.
Because the employer does not fully understand the extent of its
liability under maintenance and cure, the employer may attempt
to avoid the problem by not hiring HIV-positive individuals. Both
federal11 and state12 legislation, however, prohibit employment dis-
crimination against handicapped persons, and most existing legis-
lation has defined persons with AIDS as handicapped,' 3 entitling
them to protection. Additionally, many statutes have broadly de-
fined a "handicap" so as to extend antidiscrimination protection to
healthy, but HIV-positive, individuals.' 4 Therefore, employers who
refuse to hire HIV-positive employees merely because of their sta-
tus may be violating federal or state laws by discriminating against
handicapped persons.
The second result of the uncertainty surrounding the applica-
tion of the maintenance and cure doctrine to HIV-infected seamen
is that both the employer and employee avoid the courts. Neither
party has the incentive to litigate. Seamen with AIDS may be in
such states of weakened health that they have little incentive to
begin landmark litigation that, very possibly, may outlive them.
Because such persons have immediate needs for money, they have
great incentives to settle their claims out of court. Shipowners fear
going to court because of their potential liability under the doc-
trine of maintenance and cure. Costs for treating AIDS patients
are great, and shipowners fear that judicial precedent will establish
liability and force them to bear these costs. This desire to avoid
litigation prevents the development of a body of caselaw that
would define the extent of the duties and liabilities under the doc-
trine. Effectively, this is a self-perpetuating problem because the
development of caselaw is necessary to dispel the uncertainty, but
it is the uncertainty which precludes the development of caselaw.
This Comment seeks to help the employer chart a course be-
tween a legal Scylla and Charybdis by informing the shipowner/
employer and the seaman/employee of their rights and obligations
10. The doctrine of maintenance and cure requires shipowners to pay for the lodging
and medical expenses of sick and injured seamen. See infra parts III.C, V.A.
11. See infra part IV.B-C.
12. See infra part IV.D.
13. See infra part IV.B.-D.
14. See infra part IV.B.-D.
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under U.S. law. By providing much needed analysis, this Comment
will help each party to make an informed decision that comports
with traditional maritime principles. This Comment argues that
the most cost effective solution for the employer is not to discrimi-
nate against an HIV-positive seaman, but to employ the individ-
ual. If the employer discriminates, liability is guaranteed, but if
the employer hires the individual, then liability is only a risk, not a
certainty. Because an understanding of the nature of the disease is
essential to making informed decisions regarding employment of
an infected person, Part II of this Comment provides general infor-
mation about HIV and AIDS. Parts III and IV provide background
information regarding the doctrine of maintenance and cure and
the federal and state antidiscrimination laws, respectively. Part V
discusses these doctrines and policies as they influence the em-
ployer's decision. Finally, Part VI concludes that an informed em-
ployer will decide that hiring HIV-infected seamen is a better
course than discriminating against them.
IT. BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON THE AIDS VIRUS
The AIDS virus attacks the T-helper lymphocyte cells that
normally help produce "natural killer cells" to fight viruses.15 The
destruction of healthy T-helper cells so weakens the infected per-
son's immune system that the person becomes susceptible to previ-
ously innocuous infections."0 These infections are "opportunistic' 7
because they take advantage of a weakened immune system. But
for the presence of the HIV-virus, the infection could not success-
fully attack the person's body.
The Center for Disease Control (CDC) defines AIDS as the
presence of the HIV virus plus the diagnosis of one or more oppor-
tunistic infections.'" This definition is circular because it defines
15. Charles Marwick, "Molecular Level" View Gives Immune System Clues, 253 J. AM.
MED. ASS'N 3371, 3371-73 (1985).
16. Id.
17. Catherine Macek, Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome Cause(s) Still Elusive,
248 J. AM. MED. ASs'N 1423 (1982), available in LEXIS, Genmed Library, JNLS File. The
most common opportunistic diseases are Kaposi's sarcoma (KS)-a skin cancer, and
pneumocystis carnii pneumonia (PCP)-a type of pneumonia. Id.
18. Centers for Disease Control, 1993 Revised Classification System for HIV Infection
and Expanded Surveillance Case Definition for AIDS Among Adolescents, 269 J. AM. MED.
ASS'N 729 (1993) [hereinafter Revised Definition for AIDS]. AIDS victims often suffer from
multiple opportunistic infections. See id. The revised definition emphasizes the "clinical
importance of the CD4 T-lymphocyte count in the categorization of HIV-related clinical
1992]
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AIDS to mean HIV-positive plus the presence of an "AIDS-defin-
ing illness." Hence, the CDC can drastically affect the number of
AIDS cases by merely expanding its list of "AIDS-defining
illnesses."'"
Persons who are HIV-positive are often classified into three
categories: (1) those who are seropositive, but without any symp-
toms of AIDS; (2) those with AIDS-related complications (ARC);
and (3) those with active cases of AIDS.2 The first group of per-
sons can function completely normally as they show no symptoms
of the disease. Persons with ARC can function relatively normally,
suffering only from symptoms like diarrhea, fatigue, night sweats,
and enlarged lymph nodes.2 1 Persons with AIDS suffer from more
severe symptoms that vary with the opportunistic diseases.
Today, the consensus of the medical community is that all
HIV-positive individuals will develop AIDS and that the only real
difference between individuals is the rate at which the virus rav-
ishes their immune systems.2 2 The distinction between HIV-posi-
conditions." Id. Though this revised system replaces the 1986 definition, it retains the 23
clinical conditions previously designated and adds three more to the list. Id.
19. Prior to the approval of the 1993 revised definition of AIDS, James Curran, M.D.,
Acting Director for the CDC's Division of HIV/AIDS, said that "if the definition [of AIDS]
were changed tomorrow [to include a CD4 count below 200 cells/microliter], more than
20,000 new cases of AIDS would be recognized." Goldsmith, Affecting More Women, supra
note 2, at 1816 (quoting James Curran).
20. Marilou M. King, AIDS: Employer and Employee Rights, 9 J.L. & MED. 587, 588
(1988). Generally, a "seropositive" result to an HIV test means that a person's blood tested
positive for HIV antibodies. Marc J. Sicklick & Arye Rubinstein, A Medical Review of
AIDS, 14 HOFSTRA L. REV. 5, 5 (1985). Current test methodologies check for the presence of
HIV antibodies, not for the presence of the virus itself. See Taunya Lovell Banks & Roger
R. McFadden, Rush to Judgment: HIV Test Reliability and Screening, 23 TULSA L.J. 1, 4
(1987). "A person who tests positive is presumed to be infected with the virus." Id. at 5.
Technically, seropositivity only means that an individual has been exposed to the virus, not
that the individual has the virus. Id. Furthermore, a person's immune system could possibly
destroy the virus before it has the opportunity to attack, and hence the presence of antibo-
dies would indicate a "protective effect." See A. Bodner et al., Screening Test for HTLV-II
(AIDS Agent) Antibodies, 253 J. AM. MED. Ass'N, 225, 225 (1985) (suggesting that "it is
possible that some of the [HIV] antibod[ies] could have neutralizing or protective effects").
The predominant view of the medical community, however, is that most seropositive per-
sons are actual carriers. See Banks & McFadden, supra, at 24.
For a thorough discussion of current HIV testing procedures, see Banks & McFadden,
supra; see also Update: Serologic Testing for Antibody to Human Immunodeficiency Virus,
259 J. AM. MED, Ass'N 653 (1988).
21. King, supra note 20, at 588 (citing MEMBERSHIP PUBLICATION DIVISION, AMERICAN
MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION, AIDS: THE NEW WORKPLACE ISSUES 115 (1988)).
22. The United States has raised the average life expectancy from the diagnosis of
AIDS to death from 6 months to more than 3.5 years. Goldsmith, Amsterdam News Semi-
nar, supra note 1, at 1245-46. Some individuals may survive for as long as ten years. See
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tive and AIDS, however, may still be useful in the employment set-
ting because it may help courts decide if an individual is "qualified
for employment."
One other aspect of HIV that is of great importance to the
employment environment is the methods of HIV transmission.
Current research indicates that there are only three ways to trans-
mit HIV: (1) through transfer of body fluids during sexual inter-
course; (2) through blood transfer (for example, through blood
transfusions or sharing of drug needles); and (3) through maternal-
fetal transmission.2 3 Though research has proven the presence of
the virus in saliva, the medical community does not believe saliva
can infect another with HIV.' People do not transmit the virus
through ordinary daily contact in the work place, for example by
shaking hands or using the same bathroom facilities.2 5 Thus, while
HIV is contagious, the risk of transmission in the workplace is
minimal if one takes proper precautions. 6
III. TRADITIONAL MARITIME REMEDIES
Seamen, historically, have enjoyed access to remedies not
available to other workers. Traditional maritime law affords
seamen causes of action for unseaworthiness and for maintenance
and cure. In addition, the Jones Act27 provides an additional rem-
edy for seamen in U.S. courts.2
David J. Solomon & Andrew J. Hogan, HIV Infection Treatment Costs Under Medicaid in
Michigan, 107 PuB. HEALTH REP. 461 (1992), available in LEXIS, Genmed Library, JNLS
File ("median period of 9.2 years for seropositive adults to develop the AIDS stage of the
disease"); Theresa J. Jordan et al., Isoniazid as Preventive Therapy in HIV-Infected Intra-
venous Drug Abusers: A Decision Analysis, 265 J. AM- MED. ASS'N 2987 (1991) (mean incu-
bation period of 8.2 years).
23. See Thomas R. O'Brien et al., Human Immunodeficiency Virus Type 2 Infection in
the United States; Epidemiology, Diagnosis, and Public Health Implications, 267 J. AM.
MED. Ass'N 2775, 2775 (1992); C. Everett Koop, You Won't Get AIDS from Insects-Or a
Kiss, 103 PUB. HEALTH REP. 331, 331 (1988).
24. Sicklick & Rubinstein, supra note 20, at 7; Koop, supra note 23, at 331.
25. Koop, supra note 23, at 331.
26. See, e.g., Recommendations for Preventing Transmission of Infection with Human
T-Lymphotropic Virus Type Ill/Lymphadenopathy-Associated Virus During Invasive
Procedures, 35 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 221, 222-23 (1986) (choosing not to
prohibit the participation of HIV-infected health care workers in invasive practices and call-
ing the risk "negligible" if workers follow guidelines).
27. Jones Act, ch. 153, § 20, 38 Stat. 1185 (1920) (current version at 46 U.S.C. App.
§ 688 (1988)).
28. For a discussion of foreign seamen's rights in U.S. courts, see Paul H. Dud, Rights
of Foreign Seamen in U.S. Courts--The Law into the '80's, 7 MAR. LAw. 265 (1982) (explain-
1992]
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The traditional maritime remedies reflect a policy of protec-
tionism for seamen. In Harden v. Gordon,29 Justice Story summa-
rized the reasons for protecting seamen:
Seamen are by the peculiarity of their lives liable to sudden
sickness from change of climate, exposure to perils, and exhaust-
ing labour. They are generally poor and friendless, and acquire
habits of gross indulgence, carelessness, and improvidence. If
some provision be not made for them in sickness at the expense
of the ship, they must often in foreign ports suffer the accumu-
lated evils of disease, and poverty, and sometimes perish from
the want of suitable nourishment. Their common earnings in
many instances are wholly inadequate to provide for the ex-
penses of sickness; and if liable to be so applied, the great mo-
tives for good behaviour might be ordinarily taken away by
pledging their future as well as past wages for the redemption of
the debt. . . .The- master will watch over their health with vigi-
lance and fidelity. He will take the best methods, as well to pre-
vent diseases, as to ensure a speedy recovery from them. He will
neve e emnnee oo-badn h sic. to int.,, forlormn faw, but
his duty, combining with the interest of his owner, will lead him
to succor their distress, and shed a cheering kindness over the
anxious hours of suffering and despondency. Beyond this is the
great public policy of preserving this important class of citizens
for the commercial service and maritime defence of the nation.
Every act of legislation which secures their healths, increases
their comforts, and administers to their infirmities, binds them
more strongly to their country . . ..
Courts generally apply these policies liberally to protect seamen.
For example, the Supreme Court has dictated that courts resolve
all ambiguities and doubts in favor of seamen,8 and courts have
also labelled seamen as the "wards of the courts." 32 One must con-
sider these policies when determining the scope of traditional mar-
itime remedies.
ing that the Jones Act provides a remedy for any seaman, either foreign or domestic, who
has substantial contacts with the United States).
29. 11 F. Cas. 480 (C.C.D. Me. 1823) (No. 6,047).
30. Id. at 483.
31. Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., 318 U.S. 724, 735 n.15 (1943) ("[The] tendency to con-
fine the scope of the [shipowner's] obligation [to seamen] is consonant neither with the
liberality which courts of admiralty traditionally have displayed toward seamen, who are
their wards, nor with the dictates of sound maritime policy.") (citations omitted).
32. Boulton v. Moore, 14 F. 922, 926 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1883).
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A. Unseaworthiness
Shipowners have an affirmative duty to keep their vessels free
of unnecessary hazards. 3 General maritime law enforces this duty
by giving seamen the cause of action of unseaworthiness.3 ' The ab-
sence of an opportunity for the shipowner to correct or even be-
come aware of an unsafe condition aboard the vessel does not con-
stitute a defense."5 To grant a damage award for unseaworthiness,
a court need only find that some part of the vessel was not reason-
ably fit for its intended use and thereby caused an injury. 6 A ship-
owner has no absolute duty to provide a completely safe
ship-only a reasonably safe one.31
B. Jones Act Negligence
The Jones Act provides a claim when the shipowner's negli-
gence causes injury to a seaman." Like the doctrine of unseawor-
thiness, only seamen may recover under the Jones Act.39 The sea-
man need only prove the slightest bit of negligence to establish a
claim under the Jones Act."'
Though providing the seaman with powerful remedies and re-
quiring the shipowner to maintain a very high standard of care,
both unseaworthiness and the Jones Act require some fault, actual
or implied, on the part of the shipowner. These remedies generally
may not lend themselves to AIDS cases because a seaman with
AIDS may have great difficulty proving any negligence on the part
33. Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539 (1960); see also Italia Societa per
Azioni de Navigazione v. Oregon Stevedoring Co., 376 U.S. 315 (1964) (holding that the duty
of seaworthiness requires shipowner "to furnish a vessel and appurtenances reasonably fit
for their intended use").
34. The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903).
35. 362 U.S. at 549-50 ("[S]hipowner's actual or constructive knowledge of the un-
seaworthy condition is not essential" for the shipowner to be liable.).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 550.
38. Jones Act, ch. 153, § 20, 38 Stat. 1185 (1920) (current version at 46 U.S.C. App.
§ 688 (1988)).
39. See, e.g., David W. Robertson, A New Approach to Determining Seaman Status,
64 TEx. L. REv. 79, 85 (1985).
40. Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 352 U.S. 521, 523 (1957) (holding that
there was sufficient evidence to support jury finding that shipowner was negligent for failing
to furnish the ship with an ice cream scoop and therefore liable for injuries sustained by the
ship's baker when his hand slipped on a knife which he was using to chip the frozen ice
cream); Spinks v. Standard Oil Co., 507 F.2d 216, 223 (5th Cir. 1975) ("even the slightest
negligence suffices").
19921
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of the shipowner. While a seaman might become infected with the
AIDS virus because of an unreasonable condition of the ship or the
shipowner's negligence,"1 the shipowner can generally take mea-
sures to avoid the injury, the claim, or both.
For example, congressional legislation requires that certain
shipowners outfit their ships with specific equipment. The owner
of a ship of more than 75 tons must provide both a medicine and
slop chest for the crew.2 The medicine chest must contain enu-
merated medical items,' 3 and the slop chest must contain supplies
of disposable or consumable items such as clothing and tobacco."
The law requires the master of the vessel to offer these items to
the crew as needed for no more than ten percent over the whole-
sale cost. 5 A failure to provide an.adequately stocked medicine or
slop chest can lead to fines and civil liability.'" In the future,
courts might find that a shipowner who fails to provide prophylac-
tics such as condoms in either the medicine or slop chest, has vio-
lated the statute. Here again, however, the shipowner can avoid
liability by providing a well-equipped medicine and slop chest
which will prevent injuries and resulting claims, and help the ship-
owner defend against those claims by showing compliance with the
statute.
41. One possible way that the shipowner would be liable under either the Jones Act or
the doctrine of unseaworthiness is where the shipowner negligently stocks contaminated
blood aboard ship. Supplying contaminated blood is negligent because the blood would not
be reasonably fit for its intended purpose. See, e.g., Italia Societa per Azioni de Navigazione
v. Oregon Stevedoring Co., 376 U.S. 315 (1964) (holding that the duty of seaworthiness re-
quires shipowner "to furnish a vessel and appurtenances reasonably fit for their intended
use").
The failure to properly train and instruct the master and crew can also render a ship
unseaworthy. See In re Liberty Shipping Corp., 509 F.2d 1249 (9th Cir. 1975) (sustaining a
lower court's finding that failure to properly train the crew to use fire equipment made the
ship unseaworthy); Complaint of Ta Chi Navigation (Panama) Corp., 504 F. Supp. 209
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) ("term 'seaworthiness' . . . means the reasonable fitness of the ship for her
intended use[,] encompassing not only the ship herself but those who man her"), rev'd on
other grounds, 677 F.2d 225 (2d. Cir. 1982). In the context of AIDS, if a shipowner fails to
adequately educate the crew regarding the dangers of AIDS or fails to warn the crew regard-
ing the dangers of a port which the shipowner knows to be of high risk, a seaman could
arguably have a Jones Act claim.
42. 46 U.S.C. §§ 11,102(a), 11,103 (1988).
43. 46 U.S.C. § 11,103 (1988).
44. 46 U.S.C. § 11,103(a) (1988).
45. 46 U.S.C. 11,103 (1988).
46. See Joshua Hendy Corp. v. Clavel, 189 F.2d 37 (9th Cir. 1951).
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C. Maintenance and Cure
Unlike unseaworthiness and the Jones Act, maintenance and
cure subjects the shipowner to liability for the health of the crew
without regard to fault, thus giving the shipowner a lesser opportu-
nity to avoid liability.47 "[L]ogically and historically the duty of
maintenance and cure derives from a seaman's dependence on his
ship, not from his disability, not from anyone's fault." 8 Mainte-
nance requires the shipowner to provide food and lodging for ill or
injured seamen, while cure requires the shipowner to provide nec-
essary medical services. 9 The duty to pay both maintenance and
cure lasts until the seaman reaches the point of maximum medical
recovery.50 Injuries or illnesses contracted on land while a seaman
is in the service of the ship may also impose a duty upon the ship-
owner to pay maintenance and cure.5" Thus, an HIV-positive sea-
man may have a valid cause of action against a shipowner despite
the shipowner's complete lack of fault.2 The doctrine of mainte-
nance and cure provides a powerful remedy because it creates a
maritime lien of the highest priority"3 and imposes on the ship-
owner an obligation which does not terminate, even during the
pendency of the shipowner's bankruptcy proceedings."4
This liability, considered in light of the AIDS epidemic,
threatens to place a tremendous burden on U.S. shipowners. The
doctrine may require them, alone, to pay the substantial medical
costs of AIDS as it affects the maritime industry.5
47. Shipowners can always reduce their risk of liability under maintenance and cure by
ensuring that the crew is healthy. Education and proper medical, hygienic, and prophylactic
supplies can benefit both the seamen and shipowners, thus reducing health risks for the
industry as a whole.
48. Farrell v. United States, 336 U.S. 511, 515 (1949) (construing Aguilar v. Standard
Oil Co., 318 U.S. 724, 730 (1943)).
49. Calmer S.S. Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 525, 528 (1938).
50. E.g., id. at 530; Vaughn v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527, 531 (1962).
51. Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., 318 U.S. 724 (1943).
152. See Brown v. State of Alaska, 816 P.2d 1368, 1371 (Alaska 1991) (citing G. GILMORE
& C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY § 6-6 (2d ed. 1975)).
53. The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903); Fredelos v. Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp., 447
F.2d 435, 438-39 (5th Cir. 1971) (noting that "wages and maintenance and cure are entitled
to the two highest categories of lien priority").
54. See In re Sea Ray Marine Servs., Inc., 105 B.R. 12 (Bankr. E.D. La. 1989).
55. Formerly, the United States Public Health Service hospitals provided medical ser-
vices to seamen at no cost to either shipowners or seamen. JOHN J. HANLON & GEORGE E.
PicKETT, PUBLIC HEALTH: ADMINISTRATION AND PRACTICE 34-36 (8th ed. 1984). Congress elim-
inated these medical services through the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No.




For many HIV-positive sailors, the traditional remedy of
maintenance and cure will not address what may become their
most prevalent legal problem-employment discrimination." Ship-
owners, unsure about the limit of their liability for the mainte-
nance and cure of an infected crew member, may inquire into the
seaman's HIV status before hiring. Shipowners may believe that
they have a special need to know an individual's HIV status. These
shipowners may attempt to take advantage of an exception to lia-
bility under the doctrine of maintenance and cure which denies re-
covery to a seaman who lies about a pre-existing condition and
then seeks maintenance and cure for the treatment of that
condition. 7
A. The Applicability of Federal Antidiscrimination Laws to
Seamen
Article I!I of the Constitution extends the judiciai power of
the United States "to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Juris-
diction."' Pursuant to this provision, Congress enacted the Judici-
ary Act of 1789 which granted federal district courts "exclusive
original cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction . . . saving to suitors, in all cases, the right of a com-
mon law remedy, where the common law is competent to give it."'"
Thus, the Judiciary Act of 1789 allows a plaintiff to bring a mari-
time claim in either state or federal court.
A seaman's contract for employment is a maritime contract
For a brief summary of the history of the Public Health Service hospitals, see note 228.
56. At least one shipowner has dismissed a seaman solely on the basis of his HIV sta-
tus. See Tracy Reddick, Act-Up Protests HIV, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Sept. 15, 1992, Com-
munity Times Section, at 1.
57. Quiming v. International Pac. Enters., Ltd., 773 F. Supp 230, 235 (D. Haw. 1990);
Gray v. Bernuth, Lembcke Co., 88 F. Supp. 586, 587-88 (E.D. Pa. 1949). But see Ahmed v.
United States, 177 F.2d 898 (2d Cir. 1949) (holding that a seaman's failure to disclose his
prior hospitalization for tuberculosis did not preclude recovery for maintenance and cure
where seaman had a good faith belief that he was well enough to perform his duties); Lind-
quist v. Dilkes, 127 F.2d 21 (3d Cir. 1942) (holding that a seaman's failure to disclose that
he had an enlarged prostate did not preclude recovery for maintenance and cure after hy-
pertrophy of the prostate subsequently disabled him).
58. U.S. CONST. art. III § 2.
59. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76 (1789) (current version at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331, 1652 (1990)).
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within the federal maritime jurisdiction." However, this does not
necessarily mean that federal employment laws governs maritime
employment contracts. The seminal case for analyzing which mari-
time contracts are governed by federal, rather than state, law is
Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Insurance Co.81
1. Analytical Framework
In Wilburn Boat, the insured had breached a warranty to use
a vessel solely for private pleasure by engaging in the commercial
carriage of passengers.62 When the insured placed a claim for dam-
ages due to the destruction of the vessel by fire, the insurer refused
to pay, claiming that the breach of warranty voided the policy.63
The district court reasoned that because marine insurance con-
tracts are within admiralty jurisdiction, federal admiralty law gov-
erned the validity of the warranties." The court of appeals af-
firmed, but the Supreme Court reversed:
Since the insurance policy here sued on is a maritime con-
tract the Admiralty Clause of the Constitution brings it within
federal jurisdiction. But it does not follow, as the courts below
seemed to think, that every term in every maritime contract can
only be controlled by some federally defined admiralty rule. In
the field of maritime contracts as in that of maritime torts, the
National Government has left much regulatory power in the
States .... [T]his state regulatory power, exercised with federal
consent or acquiescence, has always been particularly broad in
relation to insurance companies and the contracts they make.
Congress has not taken over the regulation of marine insur-
ance contracts and has not dealt with the effect of marine insur-
ance warranties at all; hence there is no possible question here
of conflict between state law and any federal statute. But this
60. The English High Court of the Admiralty has adjudicated wage disputes arising out
of maritime employment contracts from very early times. See e.g., The Courtney, 1810 Edw.
Adm. 239. The U.S. district courts have never doubted their jurisdiction over maritime con-
tracts. E.g., De Lovio v. Boit, 7 F. Cas. 418, 444 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815) (No. 3776) (where
Justice Story declared "without the slightest hesitation ... that [admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction] comprehends all maritime contracts" including "contracts for maritime ser-
vice"); Babbel v. Gardner and The Catherine, Bee's Adm. Rep. 87 (D.S.C. 1796) (suit for
wages under employment contract).
61. 348 U.S. 310 (1954).
62. Id. at 311.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 312-13.
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does not answer the questions presented, since in the absence of
controlling Acts of Congress this Court has fashioned a large
part of the existing rules that govern admiralty. And States can
no more override such judicial rules validly fashioned than they
can override Acts of Congress. Consequently the crucial ques-
tions in this case narrow down to these: (1) Is there a judicially
established federal admiralty rule governing these warranties?
(2) If not, should we fashion one?6
The Court went on to hold that there was no judicially established
rule of federal maritime law governing warranties in maritime con-
tracts, and it declined to establish one.66 The Court remanded the
case for the application of the relevant state law.6
The analysis set forth in Wilburn Boat can be summarized in
a two prong test:
68
(1) Has Congress taken over the regulation of marine insur-
ance contracts? If so, to what extent has Congress preempted state
regulations in the area?
(2) If there is no controlling act of Congress, is there a Judi-
cially established federal admiralty rule of law governing the issue?
If not, should the courts fashion one? Note that this prong is
reached only if the answer to the first one is negative.
2. Marine Employment Contracts and Federal Preemption
To determine if federal law applies to marine employment
contracts, the first step is to see whether Congress has overtaken
the regulation of marine employment contracts. Certainly, Con-
gress has passed legislation which regulates employment discrimi-
nation: Congress has enacted both the Rehabilitation Act of 19739
and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990.70
The two acts reflect a congressional intent to increase employ-
ment opportunities for the handicapped. With the Rehabilitation
Act, Congress "determined that it would require [employers] to
bear the costs of providing employment for the handicapped as a
65. Id. at 313-14 (citations and footnotes omitted).
66. Id. at 316-21.
67. Id. at 321.
68. Id.
69. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 394 (current version at 29
U.S.C. § 794 (1988)).
70. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12,101 (Supp. II 1990).
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quid pro quo for the receipt of federal funds. ' 17 The ADA, how-
ever, is not so limited in its scope:7 ' it requires all employers with
more than 15 employees to bear the costs of providing employment
for handicapped persons.73 Thus, taken collectively, these acts
demonstrate a congressional intent to stop discrimination against
handicapped persons and to place the costs of employing handi-
capped individuals on the employer.
To exempt marine employment contracts from coverage of
these acts would be inconsistent with the congressional policy be-
hind them. Considering that Congress provides subsidies to U.S.
ship owners to encourage the building of more ships" and consid-
ering Congress's quid pro quo approach discussed above, the con-
clusion that federal antidiscrimination statutes govern marine em-
ployment contracts seems especially appropriate.
3. Preemption Analysis
The answer to the first question being affirmative, the issue
becomes whether and to what extent the federal legislation
preempts state antidiscrimination laws. "In determining whether a
state statute is pre-empted by federal law and therefore invalid
under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, our sole task is to
ascertain the intent of Congress.""
Of course, a congressional intent to preempt may be express or
implied. When acting pursuant to the Constitution, Congress has
the power to preempt state law in express terms. 6 Additionally, a
court may reasonably infer a congressional intent to preempt state
laws in three situations: (1) When the scheme of federal regulation
in a particular area is so comprehensive and pervasive that it
makes "reasonable the inference that Congress 'left no room' for
71. Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624, 633 n.13 (1984).
72. See Ellenwood v. Exxon Shipping Co., Nos. 92-1473, 92-1474, 1993 U.S. App.
LEXIS 362, at *19 n.9 (1st. Cir. Jan. 14, 1993) (noting that the ADA has a "far more com-
prehensive reach" than the Rehabilitation Act).
73. Currently the ADA applies to all employers who have at least 25 employees, but
after July 26, 1994, it will apply to all employers who have 15 or more employees. 42 U.S.C.
§ 12,111 (5)(A) (Supp. II 1990); 42 U.S.C. § 12,111 note (Supp. II 1990) (Effective Date).
74. See infra note 122.
75. California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 280 (1987) (citing Shaw
v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 95 (1983); Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497,
504 (1978)).
76. E.g., Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977).
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supplementary state regulation";" (2) when the subject matter
"demand[s] exclusive federal regulation in order to achieve uni-
formity vital to national interests";"8 or (3) when Congress does not
completely displace state regulation, but compliance with both
state and federal regulations is a "physical impossibility"
9 or the
state law stands "as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execu-
tion of the full purposes and objects of Congress.""'
The ADA contains explicit language regarding preemption. It
provides that courts should not construe the ADA
to invalidate or limit the remedies, rights, and procedures of any
Federal law or law of any State or political subdivision of any
State or jurisdiction that provides greater or equal protection for
the rights of individuals with disabilities than are afforded by
this chapter.8
Thus, with respect to the ADA, Congress has expressly chosen not
to preempt state law provided the state law provides greater or
equal protection than the ADA.
TT I .- L. AT A L- I A-_- --.VR.IL1.e. ile~ 2-"FL-L , tAICf: letll:UlMb~UMAI -'-LA, UYUIIMlI IIV 1JIVVIOLVII
that expresses a congressional intent for either preemption or non-
preemption.2 Thus, the Rehabilitation Act will not preempt state
statutes unless a congressional intent for preemption can be in-
ferred. Because the Act contains explicit limitations on the scope
of its application,s one cannot reasonably conclude that Congress
left "no room" for state regulation.8 4 Furthermore, preventing dis-
77. California Federal, 479 U.S. at 281 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331
U.S. 218, 230 (194.7)).
78. Florida Lime and Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 144 (1963).
79. Id. at 142-43.
80. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
81. 42 U.S.C. § 12201 (b) (Supp. II 1990).
82. Ellenwood v. Exxon Shipping Co., Nos. 92-1473, 92-1474, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS
362, at *19 n.9 (1st. Cir. Jan. 14, 1993).
83. See infra text accompanying notes 119-24.
84. See California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 280 (1987); see also,
e.g., Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 444-48 (1960) (holding
that federal inspections laws designed to protect against the perils of maritime navigation
did not so preempt the field as to leave no room for local regulation).
Note that in Ellenwood v. Exxon Shipping Co., Nos. 92-1473, 92-1474, 1993 U.S. App.
LEXIS 362, at *10-13 (1st Cir. Jan. 14, 1993), Exxon argued that "while Congress has not
fully occupied the field of handicap discrimination, . . . it has 'left no room for supplemen-
tary state regulation.'" Id. at *10 (citations omitted). In support of its argument, Exxon
pointed to language in the legislative history behind the Rehabilitation Act:
"It is intended that sections 503 and 504 be administered in such a manner
that a consistent, uniform, and effective Federal approach to discrimination
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crimination against the handicapped does not demand exclusive
federal regulation, nor does it require uniform regulation vital to
national interests86 The ADA expressly states a willingness to tol-
erate state legislation, and while the 1990 act "can have no effect
on our view of Congressional intent in 1973, it is a particularly per-
tinent example of Congress's historical practice of allowing over-
lapping remedies for employment discrimination."8 6 Thus, it would
seem unreasonable to infer a Congressional intent for the Rehabili-
tation Act to preempt state antidiscrimination laws. The more logi-
cal conclusion is that Congress intended the states to assist in the
elimination of discrimination against handicapped persons.
8 7
There may be, however, a conflict between state and federal
laws. 8 "[Wihere Congress has not entirely displaced state regula-
against handicapped persons would result. Thus, Federal agencies and depart-
ments should cooperate in developing standards and policies so that there is a
uniform, consistent Federal approach to these sections."
Id. at *11 (quoting S. REP. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6373, 6391). Section 503 requires that any contract with the federal govern-
ment in excess of $2500 must include a provision obligating the federal contractor to "take
affirmative action to employ and advance in employment qualified individuals with handi-
caps." 29 U.S.C. § 793(a) (1988).
The court of appeals pointed out that section 503 must be read in the context of the
Senate report which went on to say:
"The Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, because
of that Department's experience in dealing with handicapped persons and with
the elimination of discrimination in other areas, should assume responsibility for
coordinating the section 504 enforcement effort and for establishing a coordinat-
ing mechanism with the Secretary of the Department of Labor to ensure a con-
sistent approach to the implementation of sections 503 and 504."
Ellenwood, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 362, at *12 (quoting S. REP- No. 1297, supra, reprinted
in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6373, 6391).
The court of appeals rejected Exxon's argument and concluded that "Congress was call-
ing for a more uniform and consistent 'Federal approach to discrimination against handi-
capped persons'; nothing in the passage indicates that it was seeking to eliminate any role
for the state." Ellenwood, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 362, at *12 (quoting S. REP. No. 1297,
supra, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6373, 6391) (citations omitted) (emphasis deleted).
The court of appeals noted that its decision was consistent with that in D'Amato v. Wiscon-
sin Gas Co., 760 F.2d 1474, 1482 (7th Cir. 1985) (noting that Congress was insisting on
coordination when it required "the two responsible agencies were not to work at cross pur-
poses or to duplicate each other's efforts").
85. See Florida Lime and Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 144 (1963).
86. Ellenwood, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 362, at *19.
87. See Smith v. Lake City Nursing Home, 771 F. Supp. 985, 987 (D. Minn. 1991)
(holding that although a Minnesota Workers' Compensation Act "provides some relief
against an injured employee, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act creates a supplemental
remedy for discrimination").
88. As discussed infra notes 119-24, the application of the Rehabilitation Act turns on
whether the employer receives federal funds while that of the ADA turns on the number of
employees. States should have the opportunity to regulate those employers not governed by
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tion in a specific area, state law is preempted to the extent that it
actually conflicts with federal law." ' A conflict analysis would de-
pend upon the state law and the issues involved. For purposes of
this Comment, it is sufficient to note Congress's willingness to tol-
erate and its possible endorsement of state law in the area of
antidiscrimination.
B. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 currently
provides:
No otherwise qualified individual with handicaps ... shall,
solely by reason of her or his handicap, be excluded from partic-
ipation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimi-
nation under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance .... 90
The Rehabilitation Act defines a handicapped individual as one:
who (i) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially
limits one or more of such person's major life activities, (ii) has a
record of such an impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such
an impairment."1
Congress, however, amended the Act in 1987 to exclude protection
for any individual:
who has a currently contagious disease or infection and who, by
reason of such disease or infection, would constitute a direct
threat to the health or safety of other individuals or who, by
reason of the currently contagious disease or infection, is unable
to perform the duties of the job. 2
The Department of Health and Human Services promulgated
regulations to carry out provisions of the Act.93 These regulations
define a "physical or mental impairment" to include "any physio-
either of these acts. Of course, the states can also have concurrent jurisdiction, and if the
states provide greater protection for the employees, they should be able to regulate even
those employers governed by the federal acts. See supra text accompanying note 81.
89. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation Comm'n, 461 U.S.
190, 204 (1983).
90. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 394 (codified as amended at
29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1988)).
91. 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B) (Supp. II 1990).
92. 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(D) (Supp. II 1990).
93. See 45 C.F.R. § 84 (1991) (promulgated pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1988)).
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logical disorder or condition ... affecting one or more of the fol-
lowing body systems: neurological;. . . respiratory;. . . hemic and
lymphatic; skin; and endocrine.' The regulations also define "ma-
jor life activities" to include "caring for one's self, performing man-
ual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning,
and working."' 5
The Rehabilitation Act protects only those handicapped per-
sons who are "otherwise qualified"for the job."6 The regulations
provide that one is "otherwise qualified" if, with reasonable accom-
modation, one can perform the essential functions of the job.'1
Though the Act does not specifically address HIV, an individ-
ual with AIDS is "handicapped" under the Rehabilitation Act be-
cause HIV is a "physiological disorder or condition" that affects
the "hemic and lymphatic" systems. In addition, it is likely that
one of the "AIDS-defining" illnesses will also affect more than one
of the body systems listed.'8 The effects on these body systems
often "substantially limit" one or more "major life activi-
ties"-especially one's ability to "care for one's self."' 9 Further-
more, a seropositive individual who does not display any of the
symptoms of AIDS may qualify as handicapped because others
may "regard[ J [the infected person] as having such an impair-
ment."' 0 In most cases, neither an individual with AIDS nor one
who is seropositive should fall within the "threat to health or
safety" exclusion from protection because, though HIV is conta-
gious, the risk of transmission through ordinary daily contact is
negligible and avoidable."'0
The seminal case dealing with the threat to health and safety
94. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(i) (1991).
95. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (1991).
96. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1988).
97. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k)(1) (1991).
98. For example, PCP can affect the respiratory, sight, and skin systems; KS affects the
skin system; and Cytomegalovirus (CMV) retinitis affects the visual system. Linda Wasser-
man & Parvis Haghighi, Optic and Ophthalmic Pneumocystosis in Acquired Immu-
nodeficiency Syndrome; Report of a Case and Review of the Literature, 116 ARCH. PATHOL.
LAB. MED. 500 (1992), available in LEXIS, Genmed Library, JNLS File.
99. For example, PCP will affect one's ability to walk because it reduces oxygen intake;
PCP and severe cases of KS can affect one's ability to work; and CMV retinitis can eventu-
ally cause blindness. Id.
100. See 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B)(iii) (Supp. II 1990).




exclusion is School Board of Nassau County v. Arline.' °0 There,
the Supreme Court held that a teacher fired after her third relapse
of tuberculosis was a handicapped person protected by § 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act."0 3 The Court determined that the teacher
suffered from a physical impairment that substantially limited one
or more of her "major life activities. " 0 The school board argued
that it dismissed the teacher because of the risk that she might
transmit the disease to students. The Court held that "discrimina-
tion based on the contagious effects of a physical impairment
would be inconsistent with the basic purpose of § 504, which is to
ensure that handicapped individuals are not denied jobs or other
benefits because of the prejudiced attitudes or the ignorance of
others."' 05 For determining when a disease falls within the exclu-
sion for protection, the court endorsed the view of the American
Medical Association in stating that the relevant inquiry should
include:
facts,.based on reasonable medical judgements given the state of
medical knowledge, about (a) the nature of the risk (how the
the carrier infectious), (c) the severity of the risk (what is the
potential harm to third parties), and (d) the probabilities the
disease will be transferred and will cause varying degrees of
harm. 08
Though the Court explicitly refused to address the question of
whether a person with AIDS is "physically impaired" within the
meaning of § 504,107 the Court's analysis is equally applicable to
AIDS. 108 Other courts facing the issue consistently hold that a per-
son with AIDS is handicapped and within the protection of the
Rehabilitation Act." 9 Commentators also concur." 0
102. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
103. Id. at 276-77.
104. Id. at 281.
105. Id. at 284.
106. Id. at 288 (quoting Brief for the American Medical Association as Amicus Curiae
at 19, Arline (No. 85-1277)). These inquiries will be factually dependent.
107. Id. at 287.
108. The policy of the Rehabilitation Act is unchanged: "to ensure that handicapped
individuals are not denied jobs or other benefits because of the prejudiced attitude or the
ignorance of others." Arline, 480 U.S. at 284. Because the risk of transmitting HIV in ordi-
nary daily contact is negligible, see supra note 26 and accompanying text, there is no reason
to think the Supreme Court would not have reached the same conclusion in Arline if the
teacher had been HIV-positive instead of having tuberculosis.
109. See e.g., Chalk v. United States Dist. Court, 840 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1988) (class-
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C. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
The Americans with Disabilities Act"' provides that no em-
ployer "shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a dis-
ability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job
application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of
employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms,
conditions, and privileges of employment."11 The Act defines a
disabled person as one who (1) has a "physical or mental impair-
ment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activi-
ties of such individual""' 3 (2) has a "record of such impairment;
1 14
or (3) is "regarded as having such impairment."" 0
The ADA provides basically the same substantive protection
as the Rehabilitation Act. Both acts utilize similar three prong
tests for defining a disability; they define "physical or mental im-
pairments" in similar manners, and they both extend protection
for persons who are "regarded" as handicapped." 6 Both acts also
require that the disability affect one or more "major life activi-
ties." 1 7 The ADA, however, more specifically defines activities in
which the employer may not discriminate: "job application proce-
dures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, em-
ployee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions,
and privileges of employment.""'
room teacher with AIDS considered handicapped under § 504); Local 1812, American Fed'n
of Gov't Employees v. Department of State, 662 F. Supp. 50, 54 (D.D.C. 1987) ("[p]ersons
who carry HIV may be deemed handicapped in one or both of two ways"-actual physical
impairment or perceived impairment); Thomas v. Atascadero Unified Sch. Dist., 662 F.
Supp. 376, 381 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (child with AIDS is handicapped under § 504); District 27
Community Sch. Bd. v. Board of Educ., 502 N.Y.S.2d 325 (Sup. Ct. 1986) (holding that
children with AIDS are handicapped within meaning of the Rehabilitation Act).
110. See, e.g., Tracy Jackson Smith, AIDS and the Law: Protecting the HIV-Infected
Employee from Discrimination, 57 TENN. L. REV. 539, 573 (1990) (arguing that Arline
"clearly supports the conclusion that a symptomatic carrier of HIV is an 'individual with a
disability' "); James F. Baxley, Rehabilitating AIDS-Based Employment Discrimination:
HIV Infection as a Handicap Under the Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 19 SEroN
HALL L. REv. 23, 37-38 (1989).
111. 42 U.S.C. § 12,101 (Supp. II 1990).
112. 42 U.S.C. § 12,112(a) (Supp. 11 1990). The ADA adopted the same substantive
standards as the implementing regulations of the Rehabilitation Act.
113. 42 U.S.C. § 12,102(2)(A) (Supp. 11 1990).
114. 42 U.S.C. § 12,102(2)(B) (Supp. II 1990).
115. 42 U.S.C. § 12,102(2)(C) (Supp. 11 1990).
116. 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B) (Supp. 11 1990); 42 U.S.C. § 12,102(2) (Supp. II 1990).
117. 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B) (Supp. 11 1990); 42 U.S.C. § 12,102(2)(A) (Supp. II 1990).
118. 42 U.S.C. § 12,112(a) (Supp. 11 1990).
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The greatest difference between the Rehabilitation Act and
the ADA is in the scope of their application. The ADA currently
applies to all employers who have at least 25 employees."' After
July 26, 1994, it will apply to all employers who have at least 15
employees.12 In contrast, the Rehabilitation Act applies only to
those employers who receive "[flederal financial assistance." '2
Though they are different in scope, both acts are problematic in
their application to the shipping industry. First, not all shipowners
receive federal funds, 2' and so the Rehabilitation Act does not ap-
ply to all shipowners. The ADA may have greater application to
the U.S. shipping industry, but there are still many employers who
fall outside the scope of the Act because they have fewer than 15
employees.2  In addition, as ships become more technologically
advanced, crew sizes decrease. "4 Hence, there may be a trend for
employers to fall outside the scope of the ADA.
D. State Protection for Employees
State antidiscrimination laws may also offer protection to
seamen. State laws may apply when federal laws do not reach an
employment relationship, or they may apply coextensively with
federal laws. A survey of state laws reveals that seamen can expect
inconsistent treatment in various states.
Nearly every state and the District of Columbia have enacted
statutes that prohibit discrimination against handicapped per-
sons."'25 Most states consider AIDS discrimination a violation of
119. 42 U.S.C. § 12,111 (5)(A) (Supp. 11 1990).
120. 42 U.S.C. § 12,111 (5)(A) (Supp. 11 1990); 42 U.S.C. § 12,111 note (Supp. II 1990)
(Effective Date).
121. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1988).
122. Congress provides subsidies to operators of U.S. merchant vessels to encourage
them to build more ships. See Thomas W. Lippman, Build-Aboard Ship Subsidies Plan
Advances, WASH. POST, Dec. 11, 1982, at D10; Michael Wines, Congress Pulls a Prop Sup-
porting U.S. Shipbuilding Industry, 14 NAT'L J. 2143, 2143 (1982) ("Since 1936, America's
sickly merchant marine has been buoyed by an elaborate network of federal programs, all
aimed at funnelling business to the U.S. firms that build ships and the U.S. companies that
sail them."); Doan, supra note 6, at 43 ("Now that Congress has authorized firms to buy
vessels abroad without losing operating subsidies, U.S. shippers have been quick to respond
[by signing up for federal subsidies].").
123. See 42 U.S.C. § 12,111(5)(A) (Supp. II 1990).
124. MICHAEL MARSHALL, OCEAN TRADERS 184 (1990).
125. See Arthur S. Leonard, Employment Discrimination Against Persons with AIDS,
10 U. DAYTON L_ REV. 681, 689-96 (1985).
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their statutes, 12 6 including the major maritime states: Florida, 2 7
New York,"2 8 Massachusetts,2 9 Maryland,'80 California,"' Con-
necticut, Maine, New Jersey, Illinois, Michigan, and Washing-
ton.8 2 A few states, including Texas and North Carolina, have re-
fused to recognize AIDS as a handicap under their laws.' 33 Georgia
has a statutory provision that excludes contagious diseases from
protection, but it is not clear that this exclusion will apply to
AIDS.1
3 4
While most states prohibit discrimination against employees
with AIDS, the treatment is far from uniform. The states are also
not uniform with respect to their treatment of seropositive individ-
uals. Thus, we cannot depend on the states to provide comprehen-
sive protection "to ensure that infected individuals have equal ac-
cess to opportunities for basic necessities such as private
employment.'
3 5
126. See Brent L. Wilson & Karen L. Wingo, AIDS in the Workplace: Handicap Dis-
crimination Laws and Related Statutes, 9 J. LEGAL MED. 573, 579 (1988) (reporting that
according to a survey in 1987, 34 states considered AIDS discrimination a violation of their
handicap laws).
127. See Shuttleworth v. Broward County, 639 F. Supp. 654 (S.D. Fla. 1986) (holding
that AIDS discrimination suits may be brought under both the Florida Human Rights Act,
FLA. STAT. ch. 760 (1992), and Article I, § 2 of the Florida Constitution).
128. See People v. 49 W. 12th St. Tenants Corp., No. 83-43604 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct 7,
1983).
129. Cronan v. New England Tel. Co., 41 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1273 (Mass.
Super. Ct. 1986).
130. Maryland Rights Agency Adds HIV Infection to Definition, Daily Labor Rep.
(BNA) No. 77, at A-12 (Apr. 21, 1988).
131. Raytheon Co. v. Fair Employment and Housing Comm'n, 212 Cal. App. 3d 1242
(Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (holding AIDS is a physical handicap under both state and federal law).
132. Note, AIDS and Employment Discrimination: Should AIDS be Considered a
Handicap?, 33 WAYNE L. REV. 1095, 1105 n.81 (1987) (listing Connecticut, Maine, New
Jersey, Illinois, Michigan, and Washington as regarding AIDS discrimination violative of
state statutes); see also Robert Pear, States' AIDS Discrimination Laws Reject Justice De-
partment Stand, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 1986, at A20.
133. Hilton v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 936 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1991) (ruling that the
Texas statute, TEx. HUM. REs. CODE ANN. § 121. (West 1993), does not recognize AIDS-
infected individuals as handicapped), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 913 (1992); Burgess v. Your
House of Raleigh, Inc., 388 S.E.2d 134 (N.C. 1990) (holding that a North Carolina statute
does not protect an HIV-positive individual who does not have any physical or mental
impairments).
134. See GA. CODE ANN. §34-6A-2(3) (Michie 1982) (excluding contagious diseases).
,135. Edward E. Hollowell & James E. Eldridge, Subsistence, Equal Opportunity, and
the Individual Diagnosed with HIV, 9 J. LEGAL MED. 561, 568 (1988).
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V. THE SHIPOWNER'S DILEMMA
The shipowner/employer faces a "Hobson's choice" when de-
ciding whether to hire an HIV-positive seaman. The law may force
an employer who hires a seaman to provide maintenance and cure
should the seaman become ill while in the employ of the ship. Al-
ternatively, the employer may decide to discriminate against the
individual and face liability under federal or state antidiscrimina-
tion laws. A thorough understanding of HIV, AIDS, and potential
liabilities can help the shipowner chart a course between this legal
Scylla and Charybdis.
A. Doctrinal Analysis of Maintenance and Cure
Because no caselaw exists that specifically applies the doctrine
of maintenance and cure to AIDS," 6 a doctrinal analysis of main-
tenance and cure is necessary to understand how courts might
treat the issue. The maritime community had expected an ava-
'lhic-Te of t'S casem,- buL this has not yet occurred.
In Aguilar v. Standard Oil Company""5 the Supreme Court
noted that the shipowner's duty to pay maintenance and cure was
among the "most pervasive" of all and that courts should not nar-
rowly confine the duty through restrictive definitions. 1 3  Justice
Rutledge wrote for a unanimous court:
Created thus with the contract of employment, the liability,.
in no sense, is predicated on the fault or negligence of the ship-
owner. Whether by traditional standards he is or is not responsi-
ble for the injury or sickness, he is liable for the expense of cur-
ing it as an incident of the marine employer-employee
relationship. So broad is the shipowner's obligation, that negli-
gence or acts short of culpable misconduct on the seaman's part
will not relieve him of the responsibility. Conceptions of contrib-
utory negligence, the fellow-servant doctrine, and assumption of
the risk have no place in the liability or defense against it. Only
some willful misbehavior or deliberate act of indiscretion suffices
136. The authors searched the following online databases: LEXIS, Admiralty (Mega
File, AMC File), GenFed (Mega File); Westlaw, Maritime (FMRT-CS, FMRT-FMC, WTH-
MRT).
137. Mellman, supra note 5 at 118.
138. 318 U.S. 724 (1943).
139. Id. at 730.
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to deprive the seaman of his protection.14
Justice Rutledge's discussion on this traditional maritime doctrine




An employer has three potential defenses against a claim for
maintenance and cure. First, an employer may assert that the sea-
man has engaged in willful misconduct. Second, the employer may
argue that the seaman was not injured in the course of the ship's
service. Third, the employer may argue that the disease is incur-
rable and thus, that the employee can no longer collect mainte-
nance and cure. 
4 2
1. Willful Misconduct
A seaman need only show contraction or manifestation of a
disease during the course of employment to establish a prima facie
claim for maintenance and cure. 1 3 Willful misconduct on the part
of the seaman, however, will rebut the claim, provided that the
misconduct caused the particular illness or injury for which the
seaman seeks recovery."' Since willful misconduct constitutes a
defense to maintenance and cure, the shipowner has the burden of
proof."'
Lower courts have variously defined willful misconduct. In
140. Id. at 730-31 (citations and footnotes omitted).
141. Traditionally shipowners have a high duty to protect seamen because by their na-
ture, seamen are isolated from the rest of the world. Cf. HANLON & PICKET, supra note 55, at
33. Seamen are often away from the traditional support and risk sharing institutions such as
family, church, and community. Communities and church groups used to share the burdens
of a crisis, but today, individuals rely more on employer-provided health insurance, espe-
cially since family size has shrunk, church attendance has fallen, and communities have
become less cohesive. Thus, the growing dependency on the employer for health insurance
may reflect that the rest of society is, in a metaphorical sense, "dropping the pilot."
142. See infra part V.A.3.
143. See Farrell v. United States, 336 U.S. 511, 516 (1949); Musgrave v. Bronx Towing
Line, Inc., 219 F. Supp. 918, 921 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); see also Gore v. Maritime Overseas Corp.,
256 F. Supp. 104 (E.D. Pa. 1966) (shipowner held liable for seaman's back condition that
arose during the seaman's employment where the cause was unknown).
144. Farrell, 336 U.S. at 516; see also Zambrano v. Moore-McCormack Line, 131 F.2d
537 (2d Cir. 1942).
145. Vandinter v. American S.S. Co., 387 F. Supp. 989, 990 (W.D.N.Y. 1975) ("defend-
ant [shipowner] has failed to carry its burden of proving that the plaintiff was guilty of such
willful disobedience of orders"); Gulledge v. United States, 337 F. Supp. 1108, 1112 (E.D.
Pa. 1972) ("Once plaintiff showed that his injuries occurred while in the service of defend-
ant's vessel, to defeat recovery for maintenance and cure, the burden was on defendant to
prove that plaintiff was guilty of gross misconduct.").
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Koistinen v. American Export Lines, Inc.,1 " the court held that a
seaman could recover maintenance and cure for injuries sustained
when he jumped out of the second story window of a brothel to
avoid being beaten by the madam's body guard.1"7 The Koistinen
court specifically found that the seaman had not committed willful
misconduct, 148 but another court, in a nearly identical case found
that the seaman had committed willful misconduct.149
Some courts have held that a failure to report a preexisting
medical condition constitutes willful misconduct when such infor-
mation might have caused the shipowner not to hire the seaman."
This defense, however, may not be available when a seaman fails
to disclose his or her HIV-positive status. Persons with AIDS are
protected as handicapped under federal and state laws, and there-
fore, employers may not discriminate against such persons unless
their handicaps renders them incapable of performing the requisite
duties of the job.151 If a seaman were to disclose his or her HIV
status, the employer could not use the information in its employ-
ment decisions.5 ' Furthermore, mere HIV positivity dops indicate
that one is incapable of fulfilling the duties of a job.153 If the em-
ployer cannot use the information as a basis to not hire the sea-
man, and if the information is not indicative of the employee's
ability to perform the job, then the refusal to reveal the informa-
tion should not serve as a defense for willful misconduct.
146. 194 Misc. 942 (N.Y. City Ct. 1948).
147. Id. at 943-44. In the words of the court, Koistinen was
tossed between the horns of a most dire dilemma, to wit, the man in the doorway
and the window, the plaintiff eyeing the one with the duller point, elected the
latter means of egress undoubtedly at the time laboring under the supposition
that he was about to be used as roughly as the other man in a badger game
... " Id.
148. Id. at 946-47. "Only some wilful misbehavior or deliberate act of indiscretion suf-
fices to deprive the seaman of his protection." Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey,
318 U.S. 724, 731 (1943).
149. Matthews v. Gulf & South American S.S. Co., Inc., 339 F.2d 702, 702 (5th Cir.
1964).
150. See, e.g., Tawada v. United States, 162 F.2d 615 (9th Cir. 1947); Ward v. American
President Lines, 95 F. Supp. 609 (N.D. Cal. 1951). But see Ahmed v. United States, 177
F.2d 898 (2d Cir. 1949) (seaman with tuberculosis given relief despite his failure to report
that he had received treatment four months prior to accepting the job).
151. See supra parts IV.B-D.
152. See infra part V.C. Inquiry into an employee's HIV status would, therefore, con-
stitute strong evidence of discriminatory intent. See Wilson & Wingo, supra note 126, at
579.
153. See supra part II.
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Courts have often used vice""' as the yardstick of willful mis-
conduct. For example, courts have denied maintenance and cure
for injuries resulting solely from a seaman's intoxication on the
grounds that the seaman's willful misconduct caused the inju-
ries.155 Similarly, some courts have refused maintenance and cure
for venereal disease, invariably citing a reluctance to encourage
vice.' "
Courts must exercise caution when using vice as the measure
of willful misconduct, because two of the principal methods for
transmitting HIV relate to vice.15 A seaman could contract HIV
through sex or through sharing needles while using intravenous
drugs. A shipowner who could show that the seaman contracted
the virus through either of these two examples might escape liabil-
ity. Unlike venereal diseases such as syphilis or herpes, the symp-
toms of AIDS do not appear for years,"5 ' and testing may not de-
tect the virus for months or even years.159 Therefore, a shipowner
will have great difficulty proving that the seaman contracted the
disease through any specific activity. Indeed, even the seaman may
not know the method of contraction. Unless the shipowner carries
its burden of proving willful misconduct, a finder of fact should not
deny maintenance and cure.
Furthermore, shipowners cannot assert the defense of willful
misconduct in all cases of vice. Willful misconduct "contemplates
the intentional doing of something with the knowledge that it is
likely to result in serious injuries, or with reckless disregard of its
probable consequences. "10 In Garay v. Carnival Cruise Line,
Inc.,6 ' seamen on board the ship commonly drank to excess while
the master of the vessel turned a blind eye. When a seaman's in-
toxication led to injury and the shipowner asserted the defense of
willful misconduct, the court nonetheless awarded the seaman
154. Vice is defined as immoral conduct, practice, or habit. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1566 (6th ed. 1990).
155. Barlow v. Pan Atlantic S.S. Corp, 101 F.2d 697, 698 (2d Cir. 1939); The S.S.
Berwindglen, 88 F.2d 125, 127 (1st. Cir. 1937); Lortie v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 78
F.2d 819, 821 (9th Cir. 1935); Victoria v. Luckenbach Steamship Co., 141 F. Supp. 149
(S.D.N.Y. 1956).
156. See Ressler v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 517 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 894 (1975); Zambrano v. Moore-McCormack Line, 131 F.2d 537 (2d Cir. 1942).
157. See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
158. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
159. See generally Banks & McFadden, supra note 20.
160. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1600 (6th ed. 1990) (emphasis added).
161. 904 F.2d 1527 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1072 (1991).
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maintenance and cure.' The court reasoned that the seaman had
not committed willful misconduct because the shipowner had
neither warned the seamen of the dangers of intoxication nor pro-
hibited it.69 Thus, shipowners cannot escape their obligation to
pay maintenance and cure when the shipowner knows that the
crew regularly engages in a dangerous practice but takes no action
to either warn of the dangers or to prohibit the activity.
Because of the isolated nature of sea duty, courts cannot rea-
sonably expect seamen to be as fully aware of the dangers of cer-
tain types of behavior as a land-locked person would be.' 4 Where
a shipowner fails to provide AIDS education and fails to prohibit
high-risk behavior, courts might deny the shipowner the defense of
willful misconduct. Shipowners, however, can shore up their de-
fense by providing AIDS education'" and by establishing rules
prohibiting risky behavior while in the service of the ship.', In-
deed, AIDS education would help reduce the risk of transmitting
HIV and help the employer avoid liability. Additionally, courts
may look more favorably upon those shipowners who take mea-
sures tou ducate and protect seamen who have been said to be en-
dowed with "invincible ignorance."' 6 7
2. In the Service of the Ship
A seaman seeking maintenance and cure must prove that the
injury arose, or alternatively that the illness manifested itself, dur-
162. Id. at 1532.
163. Id. at 1531 ("Where the crew is permitted to drink, even to the point of drunken-
ness, and the ships's captain and officers are aware that crew members have been, are, and
will be drunk on board, and the ship does not prohibit such behavior on the part of the
crew, we cannot say that a seaman who indulges in intoxicating liquors is engaging in 'willful
misconduct' that is 'positively vicious' or the deliberate disobedience of orders.").
164. Seamen do not have access to the media's coverage of AIDS or the education of-
fered to land-locked society because of the transient and isolated nature of their work. Cf.
HANLON & PIcKET, supra note 55, at 33.
165. Given the special care which shipowners must exercise for their employees, see
supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text, perhaps shipowners have a special duty to edu-
cate seamen on how to avoid contracting HIV and to inform them of those ports which have
a reputation of high risk activities or which are located in an areas known to have significant
levels of HIV infection.
166. For example, the shipowner could prohibit the use of intravenous drugs while in
the service of the ship.
167. Allen R. Kelley, AIDS and Crewman, Passengers and Shoreside Employ-
ees-Defendant's Perspective, in AIDS. PUBLIC HEALTH AND MARITIME LAW SEMINAR, supra
note 5.
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ing the seaman's service of the ship. 68 Absent willful misconduct, a
seaman who can prove that the contraction of the virus occurred
while in the employ of the ship should have little difficulty recover-
ing maintenance and cure. The doctrine does not require the sea-
man to be physically aboard the vessel at the time of the injury or
illness because courts consider the seaman to be "in the service of
the ship" when ashore, even on liberty, provided the seaman is
subject to the master's recall. "
Where a seaman contracts an illness during employment on a
ship but the illness does not manifest itself until after a seaman
leaves the ship's employ, 70 the seaman can nonetheless collect
maintenance and cure from the shipowner. 7' A seaman, however,
who seeks maintenance and cure for HIV treatment after leaving
the employ of a ship must prove contraction of the virus occurred
during the employment period. Given the difficulties of proving
when the virus was contracted, the employer may be able to escape
liability. Moreover, the employer may have an easier time asserting
the defense of willful misconduct because the plaintiff must pre-
sent the circumstances surrounding contraction of the virus.
A more difficult situation arises when a prior illness manifests
or re-manifests itself during the seaman's service with the ship. If
the seaman can show that the prior condition became aggravated
during the service of the ship, the seaman can recover maintenance
and cure.17 1 In the case of HIV, an infected seaman would have to
prove that some injury, condition, or extraordinary occurrence dur-
168. Farrell v. United States, 336 U.S. 511, 516 (1949).
169. Id.
170. For a broad discussion of when the shipowner may be liable for injuries that
seamen receive while on shore leave or vacation, see Herbert Chemside, Annotation, Seamen
Who Becomes Sick or Injured on Shore Leave as "In Service of Ship" for Purposes of
Maintenance and Cure, 33 A.L.R. FED. 535 (1991).
171. See Murphy v. American Barge Line Co., 169 F.2d 61 (3d Cir. 1948); Loverich v.
Warner Co., 118 F.2d 690 (3d Cir. 1941); Morris v. United States, 3 F.2d 588 (2d Cir. 1924);
The W.H. Hoodless, 38 F. Supp. 432 (E.D. Pa. 1941); see also De Zon v. American President
Lines, 318 U.S. 660 (1943); Calmer S.S. Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 525 (1938) (holding that a
seaman's discharge does not terminate the right to maintenance and cure which should ex-
tend for a reasonable time after discharge). But see Lambos v. The Tammerlane, 47 F. 822
(N.D. Cal. 1891) (duty to pay maintenance and cure terminates with employment).
172. See Sentilles v. Inter-Caribbean Shipping Corp., 361 U.S. 107 (1959) (action for
maintenance and cure, Jones Act, and alternatively for breach of duty of unseaworthiness);
Evans v. Schneider Transp. Co., 250 F.2d 710, 712 (2d Cir. 1957); Rey v. Colonial Nay. Co.,
116 F.2d 580, 583 (2d Cir. 1941) ("If a seaman falls sick while in service, the shipowner is
responsible for maintenance and cure, even though the germs of the disease were in his
system when he joined the ship.") (citing Calmar S.S. Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 525 (1938)).
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ing service with the ship aggravated or hastened the onset of
AIDS-related symptoms. "
When shipowners deny maintenance and cure, they do so at
their own peril. If, in hindsight, a court decides that the shipowner
unjustly denied maintenance and cure, the seaman becomes enti-
tled to compensatory damages and in some cases, punitive dam-
ages as well. 174 In light of these sanctions, shipowners should pay
claims until the seaman stabilizes and until an adequate investiga-
tion has been completed. A shipowner who conducts an inadequate
investigation is also liable for punitive damages.175
3. Maximum Medical Cure
Once a court finds the seaman is entitled to maintenance and
cure, it must determine the scope of the remedy. In doing so, the
court must determine for which treatments the shipowner must
pay and how long it must continue payments.
The shipowner's duty to pay maintenance and cure for chronic
or icura. ill nes.e.. es . .. t extund indefiniteiy. :70 The duty
ends when medical authorities diagnose the affliction as incur-
able, 7 regardless of whether the injured seaman will continue to
require periodic examinations and treatments for life.17  The Su-
preme Court announced in Farrell v. United States,1 9 that a ship-
owner's duty of payment ends at the point when the seaman's con-
dition reaches maximum medical cure.'
80
The dissent in Farrell expressed concern for seamen, who
though suffering from debilitating and incurable illnesses, would
need further treatment:
[T]he injuries of seamen arising out of the service were made a
173. Cf. Sentilles, 361 U.S. 107 (seaman's tuberculosis reactivated when the seaman
washed against the ship's rail in heavy seas). Note that where the work conditions do not
contribute to the onset of symptoms, courts may deny recovery. See, e.g., Miller v. Lykes
Bros.-Ripley S.S. Co., 98 F.2d 185 (5th Cir. 1938); Brown v. Dravo Corp., 157 F. Supp. 265
(W.D. Pa. 1957).
174. Hines v. J.A. LaPorte, Inc., 820 F.2d. 1187 (11th Cir. 1987); Holmes v. J. Ray Mc-
Dermott & Co., Inc., 734 F.2d 1110 (5th Cir. 1984).
175. Holmes, 734 F.2d at 1118.
176. E.g., Farrell v. United States, 336 U.S. 511, 515 (1949); The W.H. Hoodless, 38 F.
Supp. 432 (E.D. Pa. 1941).
177. Farrell, 336 U.S. at 517.
178. Lindgren v. Shepard S.S. Co., 108 F.2d 806, 807 (2d Cir. 1940).
179. 336 U.S. 511 (1949).
180. Id. at 513.
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charge against the enterprise to the extent at least of mainte-
nance and cure. Their maintenance and cure was indeed part of
the cost of the business. It is nonetheless a legitimate cost
though the expense continues beyond the time when a maxi-
mum cure has been effected.'
Despite this concern, the Court refrained from imposing the bur-
den of open-ended medical care on shipowners. The Court's value
judgment, however, was weighted by the knowledge that the bur-
den of continuing treatments would not fall upon the seaman
alone. At the time of the Farrell decision, there were federally-
funded Public Health Service Hospitals that absorbed much of the
costs of treating injured and ill seamen." 2 The amount and extent
of the damages awarded to injured plaintiffs often reflected this
fact.'8 3 In 1981, Congress abolished these hospitals,
8 4 and thus to-
day, the courts must reconsider the values underlying the doctrine
which now places the cost of paying for AIDS treatment on the
seaman.
In 1975 the Supreme Court reiterated the Farrell standard in
Vella v. Ford Motor Co:'8 5 the duty to pay "maintenance and cure
continues until such time as the incapacity is declared to be per-
manent."'8 6 Before Congress abolished the Public Health Service
Hospitals, some courts criticized the harshness of the Farrell
rule. 8 7 Given that the Supreme Court has not confronted the rule
since 1975, and given that the harshness of the rule has increased
significantly with the changes in the health system, the Supreme
Court may re-evaluate the equities and announce a modified rule
when it has the opportunity. Unless and until the Supreme Court
modifies the Farrell standard, a seaman must work within the doc-
181. Id. at 524 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (footnote deleted).
182. See supra note 55; see also inira note 228.
183. Calmer S.S. Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 525, 531 (1938) ("[C]ourts take cognizance of
the marine hospital service where seamen may be treated at minimum expense, in some
cases without expense, and they limit recovery to the expense of such maintenance and cure
as is not at the disposal of the seamen through recourse to that service.").
184. See supra note 55.
185. 421 U.S. 1 (1975).
186. Id. at 5.
187. Cox v. Dravo Corp., 517 F.2d 620, 627 (3d Cir. 1975) (noting that although "[ilt
may be sound social policy that vessel and cargo be required to insure against the cost of
palliative or preventive care and for maintenance of [incurably ill] seamen," courts must
apply the Supreme Court rule announced in Farrell); Desmond v. United States, 217 F.2d
948, 950 (2d Cir. 1954) (Judge Frank wrote, "The writer of this opinion thinks the ruling
unduly harsh; but what he thinks is immaterial (unless, perhaps, it induces the Supreme
Court to change the doctrine it has adopted).").
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trine as it stands.
Within the context of HIV, the application of this concept is
uncertain. AIDS has two aspects: (1) the virus assaults the immune
system; and (2) opportunistic infections take advantage of a weak-
ened immune system. Each opportunistic infection has its own eti-
ology, treatment, and prognosis. Courts could apply the concept of
maximum medical cure to both the infection of HIV and the op-
portunistic infections. Therefore, the law would require a ship-
owner to pay maintenance and cure for an opportunistic infection
only until that infection reaches, a point beyond which further im-
provement is not possible. For example, a bout of pneumonia is
not incurable, though in a particular case, the patient may have a
poor prognosis."8 If applicable to opportunistic infections, the doc-
trine of maintenance and cure would require the shipowner to pay
for medical treatment until the seaman recovered from the pneu-
monia, but would not require payment for the continued treatment
of HIV if further improvement was not possible.'89
Allowing the doctrine to distinguish between the virus and the
opportunistic infections provides seamen with limited recovery and
treatment. This approach also furthers the two general principles
that guide courts in making maritime rules: insuring the well-being
of seamen and encouraging maritime commerce.'90 The seaman ob-
tains relief to combat the immediate health threat, which may pro-
vide time to prepare for coping with the infection. Furthermore,
this approach is not unduly burdensome on the shipowner because
its liability is limited to treatment of immediate health risks.'91
When applying the doctrine of maintenance and cure to HIV,
the critical issue is whether the disease is incurrable, or in other
words, whether there is no effective treatment. Because there is
some dissension among the medical community over whether HIV
positivity will always end in AIDS, the issue of curability may very
well come down to a battle of experts with the finder of fact decid-
188. A poor prognosis will not relieve the shipowner of the duty to pay maintenance
and cure for treatment of a beneficial and curative nature. See infra note 195 and accompa-
nying text.
189. If the Court abandons the harsh rule in Farrell, then distinguishing between HIV
and opportunistic infections becomes unnecessary.
190. See, e.g., Harden v. Gordon, 11 F. Cas. 480, 483 (C.C.D. Me. 1823) (No. 6,047).
191. Of course, if the seaman leaves the employment of the ship and then develops an
opportunistic infection, the distinction between HIV and opportunistic infections becomes
irrelevant. The rule of incurability would preclude recovery for the HIV infection, and the
service of the ship doctrine would preclude recovery for the opportunistic infection.
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ing if a qualified treatment exists for HIV. 11" Some courts have
ruled that where extensive controversy exists among medical ex-
perts, courts should decide the issue in favor of seamen.10 8 Though
the dissension in the medical field may not amount to extensive
controversy, there is room for discretion, and policy strongly sug-
gests exercising this discretion in favor of the seamen.
Courts must constantly monitor the state of medical knowl-
edge in deciding whether there is an effective treatment for AIDS,
especially now when scientists are actively engaged in extensive re-
search and are, as of late, showing some progress.'" The Supreme
Court has intimated that a seaman who has reached maximum
medical cure might in the future be entitled to additional benefits
if a curative treatment becomes available.' 5
B. Doctrinal Analysis of Antidiscrimination Acts
The reasonable implication of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
is that Congress "determined that it would require [employers] to




192. Breese v. AWl, Inc., 823 F.2d 100, 104 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that the question of
when a seamen reaches maximum medical cure is a medical one, not a legal one); Mroz v.
Dravo Corp., 293 F. Supp. 499, 508 (W.D. Penn. 1968) ("whether such help was palliative or
curative was for the jury to determine").
193. Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527, 532 (1962) ("When there are ambiguities and
doubts [about the shipowner's liability for maintenance and cure] they are resolved in favor
of the seaman."); see also Johnson v. Marlin Drilling Co., 893 F.2d 77, 79 (5th Cir. 1990)
("[T]ermination of the seaman's right to maintenance should be based on an unequivocal
medical determination.") (construing Tullos v. Resource Drilling Inc., 750 F.2d 380, 388 (5th
Cir. 1985)).
194. John Abell, Nascent AIDS Therapy Stokes Hopes--and Cautions, REUTER LIaR.
REP., February 19, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File (reporting that re-
searchers have developed a treatment, effective in a test tube, but unproven in humans).
Whether an infected person would need to take this medication for life in order to suppress
the virus or whether the medication would cure the disease is not clear. Any seaman with
HIV who could show improvement in his or her medical condition due to a new treatment
might have a claim to maintenance and cure though it could take years to determine if the
treatment does, in fact, lead to a cure.
195. Farrell v. United States, 336 U.S. 511, 519 (1949)("The Government does not con-
tend that if Farrell receives future treatment of a curative nature he may not recover in a
new proceeding the amount expended for such treatment and for maintenance while receiv-
ing it.").
196. United States Dept. of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans, 477 U.S. 597, 605 (1986)
(quoting Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624, 633 n.13 (1984)); see also Robert
A. Kushen, Asymptomatic Infection with the AIDS Virus as a Handicap Under the Reha-
bilitation Act of 1973, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 563, 567 (1988) (arguing that Congress intended
employers to bear the greater than normal risks of high health care costs associated with
handicapped individuals).
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Therefore, an employer cannot refuse to hire a handicapped person
on the economic grounds that the costs of hiring the person places
an undue burden on the employer. Instead, the employer must
show that the individual is not "otherwise qualified," for example
by showing that the employee poses a severe risk to other employ-
ees. 197 In short, the employer's increase in insurance costs are not
relevant to an individual's ability to perform a job.
To allow an employer to discriminate against seropositive per-
sons because of the fear that the increases in health costs may
drive it out of business would emasculate both the Rehabilitation
Act and the ADA. It would contradict the congressional decision
that employers should bear such costs. Of course, Congress ex-
empted small employers from the ADA,' 9 8 and one might argue
that these small employers have an affirmative defense. Most
states, however, make no such exemption from their antidis-
crimination statutes. These state laws would then preclude small
employers from discriminating.
Furthermore, to allow affirmative defenses based on the antici-
pated increases in health costs would open the door for the em-
ployer to discriminate against other costly illnesses such as can-
cer.199  One critical distinction, however, exists between
asymptomatic HIV infection and other costly catastrophic ill-
nesses: the ability to test for HIV gives employers the unique op-
portunity to screen out this group of individuals who pose in-
creased health risks.200
An employer cannot base the refusal to hire on the grounds
that an HIV-positive individual will experience excessive absentee-
ism and decreased productivity. While excessive absenteeism and
decreased productivity are of course valid grounds for dismissal,
these factors should not influence the hiring decision unless the job
requires extensive training and an expectation of a long employ-
ment term.20 ' Current medical evidence suggests that fears of ab-
senteeism and lower productivity are extremely speculative. Re-
197. 29 C.F.R. §32.14(a) (1992) (job qualifications must be "consistent with business
necessity and safe performance"); see also supra text accompanying notes 92-97.
198. Congress gave a grace period to businesses that employed between 15 and 25 work-
ers. The ADA will not apply to these employers until 1994. 42 U.S.C. § 12,111(5)(A) (Supp.
II 1990); 42 U.S.C. § 12,111 note (Supp. II 1990) (Effective Date).
199. Kushen, supra note 196, at 577.
200. Id. at 578 n.84.
201. Good health might be a "business necessity" for foreign service employees given a
lengthy assignment in an undeveloped country.
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search shows that the time between contraction of HIV and the
onset of symptoms can vary between 4.6 to 9.6 years. e20 During this
time, the employee may test positive and still be "otherwise quali-
fied" to perform the demands of the job. Therefore, seropositivity
bears little relation to such an individual's productivity.
Even after the infected individual begins to show symptoms,
the employee is likely to experience cyclic periods of "normal" and
"bad" health.203 There is no medical reason that the employee can-
not work during the periods of good health. Commentators propose
that the employer treat all but the worst cases of cyclic "bad
health" as other temporary disabilities, such as pregnancy, by plac-
ing the disabled individual on temporary leave.""4 This conclusion
comports with federal requirements that an employer make rea-
sonable accommodations for a handicapped individual. ' 05 Thus, it
would seem that the employer may effectively utilize the services
of these seamen during the "normal health" periods provided that
the voyages are not lengthy.
Assuming that the employer must grant temporary leave to
AIDS patients, the employer's obligation would not continue indef-
initely. Because the HIV infection is degenerative, the employee
will suffer from a deteriorating physical condition and hence, may
eventually become unable to perform some or all of the duties of
the job. At this point, the employer can show that the seaman is
not "otherwise qualified" to perform the job and that the burden
of accommodation will cause undue hardship on the employer.
Under federal statutes and most state statutes, such a refusal to
hire or a decision to terminate the employment of an HIV-positive
202. See Solomon & Hogan, supra note 22 ("median period of 9.2 years for seropositive
adults to develop the AIDS stage of the disease"); Jordan et al., supra note 22 (mean incu-
bation period of 8.2 years); Nancy Mueller, The Epidemiology of the Humran Immu-
node/iciency Virus Infection, 14 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE, 250, 254 (1986) (mean latency
period between infection and onset of symptoms is 4.5 years); MARTIN GUNOERSON ET. AL.,
AIDS: TESTING AND PRIVACY 16 (1989) (most people infected with HIV remain symptomless
for at least eight years); Elliott J. Millenson, AIDS Tests: Do It Yourself? FDA's No-Home-
Testing Policy is Endangering Everyone, WASH. POST, Aug. 27, 1989, at C-5 ("median time
between infection and the onset of symptoms is 9.6 years, according to a recent University
of California at San Francisco study").
203. Arthur S. Leonard, AIDS and Employment Law Revisted, 14 HOFSTRA L. REV. 11,
35 (1985).
204. Id.
205. Reasonable accommodations include shifting work hours, reducing schedules and
allowing rest periods. While at sea, many forms of accommodation will not be available to
the employer because of the nature of the maritime workplace. Many accommodations that
seem "reasonable" on land may be "unreasonable" at sea.
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individual would not constitute discrimination against the handi-
capped. Requiring the employee to be "qualified" to perform the
job's tasks mitigates the apparent harshness of the rule that would
grant AIDS patients temporary leave.
C. Testing for HIV in the Workplace
Given the current state of testing capabilities, HIV testing
serves no legitimate purpose for most employment positions."' 6
The results of HIV testing are often inconclusive. A seronegative
test result only indicates that a particular blood sample contained
no HIV antibodies at the time of the test.2"7 A negative result is
inconclusive. One who tests negative may indeed be HIV-free; may
have been exposed to the virus but the person's immune system
has not yet produced sufficient antibodies for the test to detect; or
may in fact carry the virus, but the test failed to detect it. A posi-
tive test result is also inconclusive. A positive test result may indi-
cate that one has the AIDS virus; that one's body has successfully
attacked and destroyed the virus; or that the tpt is inaceirat.e and
has falsely indicated seropositivity.'0 Thus, HIV testing serves lit-
tle purpose in the workplace-and may indeed give a person a false
sense of security by indicating that one does not carry the virus.
Some argue that HIV testing does serve a purpose in employ-
ment positions where there is a legitimate health risk to others."'
In such cases, seropositivity may be relevant to employment. The
medical community, however, adopts a different approach. Leading
206. Testing required by federal or state governments poses many constitutional objec-
tions because the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments protect "the privacy and security of
individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials." Camara v. Municipal
Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967). Testing is an invasion of individual privacy, both physically
because testing requires drawing blood and emotionally because testing may reveal details
of one's personal lifestyle which are beyond any legitimate employment interest. Privacy is a
right protected by the "penumbras" of the Fourth Amendment, Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965), and the government cannot invade the right of privacy without
sufficient reason. See, e.g., Anonymous Fireman v. City of Willoughby, 779 F. Supp. 402
(N.D. Ohio 1991) (upholding the right of local government to test firefighters because of
potential risk of transmission due to common injuries). Because the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments protect individuals only from invasions by federal and state governments, re-
spectively, these Amendments do not protect against invasions of privacy by private
employers.
207. See supra note 20.
208. See supra note 20; see generally Banks & McFadden, supra note 20.
209. HIV testing might play an important and useful role in preventing HIV transmis-
sion among "actor[s] in pornographic productions" and among sex therapists acting as sur-
rogates with their patients. Leonard, supra note 203, at 43 n.143.
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medical researchers have refused to issue recommendations to re-
move infected medical personnel from jobs involving "invasive pro-
cedures."21 Instead, hospitals and doctors have adopted proce-
dures that eliminate-or at least reduce to a negligible level-the
risk of transmitting viruses.21 This policy is equivalent to treating
all medical personnel and all patients as HIV carriers. After all,
there is no absolute way to prove that someone is truly HIV-nega-
tive. The approach of the medical community is more logical than
the use of HIV testing because adopting "safe" procedures reduces
the risk of transmission, while testing alone does little to prevent
the transmission of the virus.
Some employers may see HIV testing as a way to eliminate
high health risks from the workplace. Regardless of the motivation,
HIV testing fails miserably as a means of predicting complications
in the workplace. Seronegativity does not mean HIV free, and ser-
opositivity is not highly predictive of when an individual will suffer
from ARC or AIDS.21' Thus, while HIV testing may ultimately re-
duce certain health risks, it is neither a practical nor efficient
means of doing so.
Limited legislation is available to protect employees against
unscrupulous employers. At the federal level, the EEOC has
promulgated guidelines which prohibit employers from asking job
applicants certain non-job-related questions; ignoring these guide-
lines leaves the employer at risk for charges of unlawful discrimi-
nation in hiring.21 In addition, some states, including Florida,""
California,"' Massachusetts,1  and Wisconsin,2" have enacted leg-
islation which restricts employers in their use of HIV testing in
hiring. Such legislation defines the outer limits for testing and pro-
vides only limited protection for individuals-without regard to
HIV status.
Given the limited and inconclusive medical information which
HIV testing provides, it is illogical and illegitimate to allow HIV
testing in the workplace. The medical community has adopted a
210. See supra note 26.
211. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
212. See supra notes 22, 202.
213. Uniform Guidelines on EEOC Employee Selection Procedure, 29 C.F.R. § 1607
(1992).
214. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 381.004 (West Supp. 1993).
215. CAL, HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 119.20-119.25 (West 1990 & Supp. 1993).
216. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 111, § 70F (West 1992).
217. WIs. STAT. ANN. §103.15 (West 1988 & Supp. 1992).
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more logical policy: utilize procedures that reduce the risk of virus
transmission to a negligible level. Furthermore, HIV testing may
promote illegitimate practices. Testing provides information with
which an employer can discriminate, a practice that contravenes
the policy of the federal government, as well as that of many
states.
D. The Employer's Decision
The shipowner/employer has many factors to consider when
deciding whether to hire an HIV-positive applicant. An employer
who chooses to hire the individual may be liable for maintenance
and cure, subject to the limitations described above, if the appli-
cant does indeed become ill while serving the ship. Furthermore,
the employer's failure to pay the employee's maintenance and cure
may result in the court imposing punitive damages.2 1 These dam-
ages may be significant, especially considering that courts are tra-
ditionally very protective of seamen and that the employer refused
to pay morley that i was legally obligated to pay, at a time when
the seaman had urgent medical needs.
An employer may discriminate against an HIV-positive indi-
vidual, but not without costs. Such discrimination will likely vio-
late federal or state laws and may result in compensatory damages
for mental anguish and punitive damages.
219
Though most employers are unable to utilize pre-employment
testing of HIV status, for those who do, maintaining confidentiality
of an individual's HIV-status is problematic. Regardless of how the
employer learned the information, maintaining this confidentiality
218. See Michael Reese Davis, Punitive Damages for Maintenance and Cure: Is it How
Much You Pay or How You Pay It-Harper v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 104 MAR. LAW. 103
(1985). Because the duty to pay maintenance and cure is absolute, courts impose punitive
damages to make examples out of those shipowners who fail to live up to this duty. Id.
219. Antidiscrimination statutes also provide for back pay in the case of wrongful dis-
charge. See, e.g., Cain v. Hyatt, 734 F. Supp. 671 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (awarding a wrongfully-
discharged attorney, who reported his HIV status to his employer, $42,888 in backpay,
$65,000 for mental anguish, and $50,000 in punitive damages under the Pennsylvania
Human Rights Relations Act); Club Swamp Annex v. White, 561 N.Y.S.2d 609 (Sup. Ct.
1990) (awarding back pay and $5,000 in compensatory damages for mental anguish to waiter
diagnosed with ARC); see also Jury Awards Waiter Back Pay in First AIDS Bias Verdict
in Texas, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 104, at A-9 (May 30, 1990) (reporting a jury award of
$60,000 in back pay to waiter discharged because of HIV and citing Gardner v. Rainbow
Lodge, Inc., CA No. H-88-1705 (S.D. Tex. 1990)).
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also poses financial risks for employers.2 2 In Shuttleworth v.
Broward County,21 a county budget analyst sued his employer for
violating his constitutional right of privacy.222 Though the parties
settled out of court and did not disclose the settlement amount, it
has been reported to be nearly $200,000.21 Some state statutes im-
pose civil and criminal liability for wrongful disclosure of HIV test
results.2 4 Thus, an employer must exercise extreme caution with
information regarding an employee's HIV status.
Another source of employee protection-the collective bar-
gaining agreement-may limit an employer's actions. Collective
bargaining agreements 5 may offer protection for covered employ-
ees because most agreements require "just cause" to dismiss an
employee.2 Mere HIV positivity does not constitute "just cause"
to dismiss an employee who is "otherwise qualified" to perform the
requirements of a job. Hence, a shipowner could not dismiss a sea-
man because of that seaman's HIV status, provided a collective
bargaining agreement with a "just cause" provision protects the
seaman.
22 7
220. See Discrimination, Confidentiality Suits Pose Biggest AIDS Risks, 9 HosP. RIsK
MGMT. 13 (1987).
221. 639 F. Supp. 654 (S.D. Fla. 1986).
222. Id. The Florida Constitution includes a right to privacy. FLA. CONST. art. I § 23.
223. Patricia A. Curylo, AIDS and Employment Discrimination: Should AIDS Be Con-
sidered a Handicap?, 33 WAYNE L. REV. 1095, 1103 n.65. (1987).
224. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 199.21 (imposing civil and criminal liabil-
ity for wrongful disclosure of HIV test results); see also Woods v. White, 689 F. Supp. 874
(W.D. Wis. 1988) (holding that prison inmate retains constitutional right to privacy though
incarcerated and that prison officials are not immune from liability for their disclosure to
non-medical persons that certain inmates had AIDS).
225. Collective bargaining agreements cover an estimated one fifth of the civilian
workforce. Leonard, supra note 203, at 36 n.116.
226. For an analysis of "just cause" terminations, see Roger I. Abrams & Dennis R.
Nolan, Toward a Theory of "Just Cause" in Employee Discipline Cases, 1985 DUKE L.J.
594, 610-12.
227. It would also be possible for the collective bargaining units to negotiate directly for
the protection of HIV-infected employees. "Section 8(d) of the [National Labor Relations
Act] provides that the employer and the employee representative are obligated to bargain
'with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment.'" NLRB v.
BASF Wyandotte Corp., 798 F.2d 849, 852 (5th Cir. 1986). Though the act does not define
"other terms and conditions of employment," "substantial jurisprudence" considers health
and safety issues to be mandatory bargaining terms. Id. at 852 n.1. Because health and
safety issues are mandatory bargaining terms, an employer must negotiate with the employ-
ees' bargaining agent on these terms. The act, however, does not require that the parties
reach an agreement; it only requires that they bargain in good faith. See, e.g., NLRB v.
Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp, 356 U.S. 342 (1958) ("the Act requires bargaining, not
agreement").
The uncertainty surrounding the application of maintenance and cure to seamen with
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An employer may choose to implement an AIDS education
and prevention program. By teaching seamen about AIDS and the
risks of it transmission, the shipowner can reduce future exposure
to actions based on maintenance and cure, unseaworthiness and
Jones act negligence. Education will reduce not only the number of
future lawsuits, but can also reduce the number of infections. All
involved will thus benefit.
VI. CONCLUSION
Because our public health systems evolved out of the maritime
industry and its need to care for seaman,228 it is ironic that at a
time when we face one of the worst epidemics in our history, the
public health system cannot adequately support those very indi-
viduals for whom Congress originally created the system. For de-
cades, the government provided hospitals for the care of merchant
seamen, 229 but in 1981, on the brink of the AIDS crisis, Congress
eliminated these hospitals. 30 Under traditional maritime princi-
ples, there can be little doubt that the shipowners, not the seamen,
should fill the void in health care left by the elimination of mari-
time hospitals. Courts have long recognized that seamen need spe-
cial protection, and therefore, courts generally hold maritime em-
ployers to a greater standard of care as to their employees than
land-based employers. Furthermore, antidiscrimination statutes
demonstrate a congressional intent that the employer, not the em-
AIDS coupled with the fact that the employer is only obligated to negotiate-and not to
reach an agreement-makes such negotiations unlikely in the maritime industry, at least for
now.
228. From the birth of the United States, maritime trade was one of this country's
greatest resources. HANLON & PIcKETT, supra note 55, at-33. While farmers and merchants
"had firm roots in their respective communities," the seaman had no permanent abode nor
permanent route. Id. When seamen became ill, they had no where to turn. They were not
eligible for benefits, and local authorities refused to assume the responsibility of treatment
because they did not pay any local or state taxes. Furthermore, the seamen were underpaid
and their wages were often quickly spent at the many taverns and brothels that thrived near
the ports. Id. The young American Congress recognized the necessity to protect the seamen
and proposed a bill at its very first session. The Marine Hospital Service Act, however, was
not actually adopted until June 1798. Id. at 34. This act represented the first attempt of the
federal government to deal with public health issues at a national level, and the Act ulti-
mately led to the establishment of the American Public Health Association. Id. at 34-35. In
1902, Congress renamed the Marine Hospital Service as the Public Health and Marine Hos-
pital Service and placed it under the direction of the Surgeon General. Congress again
changed the name in 1912 to the U.S. Public Health Service. Id. at 36.
229. Id. at 34-36.
230. Id.
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ployee, should bear the costs of hiring handicapped employees. To
implement this policy, Congress enacted the Rehabilitation Act
and the Americans with Disabilities Act. It is, therefore, only fit-
ting that these acts apply to shipowners and other marine
employers.
General maritime law and Congressional legislation 23 1 have
given an employer a tough decision: hire an HIV-infected seaman
or face liability for discrimination. Without a thorough under-
standing of HIV, AIDS, and the extent of liability under mainte-
nance and cure, an employer may choose to discriminate. An in-
formed employer, however, should decide otherwise. The more cost
effective solution for the employer is not to discriminate against an
"otherwise qualified" seaman who is HIV-positive, but to employ
the individual. Discrimination in violation of a federal or state
statute will undoubtedly lead to the employer's liability. But if the
employer hires the individual, then liability is only a risk, not a
certainty. It is entirely possible that the employer may benefit
from a productive employee without incurring any additional costs.
FLOYD BRANTLEY CHAPMAN*
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231. While antidiscrimination statutes are a step in the right direction, they do not
address the problem of AIDS directly. We must treat the AIDS crisis as we would treat any
natural disaster: with an effective management plan. We must deal with this national crisis
on a national level. Our President must develop a national plan that can mobilize all
branches of government to effectively manage this disaster. This plan must provide health
care for AIDS victims, social services for the victims and their families, and educational
programs that teach all persons-from grade school children to adults-how to prevent the
spread of AIDS. However, preventing the transmission of AIDS does not amount to a cure.
This national plan must finance much-needed research to find an effective treatment and
vaccine for the HIV virus. Finally, our government must play a more active role to prevent
discrimination against HIV-positive victims in the workplace. While Congress has taken
some steps toward that goal, the antidiscrimination statutes in and of themselves are not
enough. The nation needs a comprehensive plan.
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